Wednesday, June 30, 2010

Madame president

 

Most "orthodox" congregations I know about - Sefardi and Ashkenazi - have one thing in common: women are prohibited from being elected president of the congregation.

I'm "old school" and the idea of a woman as rabbi or hazan is foreign to me.

But knowing women who (very) successfully run their own - or their husband's - business makes me wonder why they are banned from running the business affairs of a synagogue.

No one is suggesting the congregation board tell the rabbi about the Law (although boards do that by retaining or releasing religious leadership); the board is to attend to the business of the congregation, and it truly IS a business. If you look at most congregations, it is the Sisterhood that not only gets things organized, but gets them done as well.

So why CAN'T women hold any and all board positions?

Are we going backwards? (And if so, maybe we should go backwards to Deborah and Beruryah.)

The following were comments on "womens' rights" by the first Hakham Bakshi of modern Israel.

First Sephardi Chief Rabbi of Israel Ben Zion Uziel on Women’s Rights
http://tinyurl.com/2vvpmuv

It is instructive reading this not only to take notice of the clear common sense that radiations from Rav Benzion Uziel’s words as for the grace and dignity and learning with which his ideas are expressed, a grace and dignity all too often shabbily absent in today’s tawdry proceedings where shrill voices dominate and hateful language is the order of the day from all sides. The words of Rav Ben Zion Uziel are a cool tonic in an overheated room and it is noteworthy that the ideas they express have long ago become all but barred from public discourse in the Haredi world as something foreign and alien.

Following is an except of Rabbi Ben Zion Uziel’s complete letter which can be found at http://www.edah.org/backend/coldfusion/journal_images/journal1_2.pdf.

“WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND IN INSTITUTIONS OF PUBLIC AND YISHUV LEADERSHIP”
Rabbi Ben Zion Uziel, 1920

Women’s Right to Vote

This issue became a central controversy in Eretz Yisrael, and the whole Land of Israel rocked with the debate. Posters and warnings, pamphlets and newspaper articles appeared anew every morning, absolutely prohibiting women’s participation in the elections. Some based their argument on “Torah Law,” some on the need to preserve the boundaries of modesty and morals, and others on the wish to ensure the peace of the family home. All leaned upon the saying “The new is prohibited by Torah (hadash asur min ha-torah).”

Regarding the first [heading], we find no clear ground to prohibit this, and it is inconceivable that women should be denied this personal right. For in these elections we elevate leaders upon us and empower our representatives to speak in our name, to organize the matters of our yishuv, and to levy taxes on our property. The women, whether directly or indirectly, accept the authority of these representatives and obey their public and national directives and laws. How then can one simultaneously “pull the rope from both ends”: lay upon them the duty to obey those elected by the people, yet deny them the right to vote in the elections?

If anyone should tell us that women should be excluded from the voting public because “their minds are flighty (da`atan qalot)” (Shabbat 33b and Qiddushin 80b) and they know not how to choose who is worthy of leading the people, we reply: Well, then, let us exclude from the electorate also those men who are “of flighty minds” (and such are never lacking). However, reality confronts us clearly with the fact that, both in the past and in our times, women are equal to men in knowledge and wisdom, dealing in commerce and trade and conducting all personal matters in the best possible way. Has it ever been known that a guardian is appointed to conduct the affairs of an adult woman, against her will?

The meaning of our Rabbis’ statement, “da`atan qalot,” is entirely different. Also, the statement “women have no wisdom except with regard to the spindle” (Yoma 66b), is only flowery wording intended to circumvent a question posed by a woman.

But perhaps this should be prohibited because of licentiousness? But what licentiousness can there be in this, that each person goes to the poll and enters his voting slip? If we start considering such activities as licentious, no creature would be able to survive! Women and men would be prohibited from walking in the street, or from entering a shop together; it would be forbidden to negotiate in commerce with a woman, lest this encourage closeness and lead to licentiousness. Such ideas have never been suggested by anyone.

(Editor’s Note: Today they are commonly suggested)

A great innovation was advanced by Rabbi Dr. Ritter, who advocates denying suffrage to women because they are not qahal or edah, and were not counted in the census of the people of Israel nor subsumed into the genealogical account of the families of Israel. (His article is not before me, and I rely on the report by Rabbi Hirschensohn.)

Well, let us assume that they are neither qahal nor edah, and were counted neither in census nor as “family” or anything. But are they not creatures, created in the Divine Image and endowed with intelligence? And do they not have concerns that the representative assembly, or the committee it will choose, will be dealing with? And will they not be called upon to obey these bodies regarding their property as well as the education of their sons and daughters?

In conclusion: having found not the slightest grounds for this prohibition, I find that no one has the slightest right to oppose or to deny the wishes of part of the public on this matter. Regarding a similar situation, it has been said: “Even if ninety-nine request imposed distribution, and only one demands outright competition, that one should be followed, for his demand is legally right”(Mishnah Pe’ah 4:1). Over and above this, it has been stated: “Women were allowed to lay hands [on their sacrifice] for the sake of giving them a feeling of gratification” (Hagigah 16b), even though such an act appeared to the public as prohibited; how much more so in our case, where there is no aspect of prohibition at all, and where preventing their participation will be for them insulting and deceitful. Most certainly, in this case we should grant them their right.

Logic dictates that in no serious assembly or worthy discus- sion is there licentiousness. Daily, men meet and negotiate with women in commercial transactions, and yet all is peace and quiet. Even those inclined to sexual licentiousness will not contemplate the forbidden while seriously transacting business. Our rabbis did not say “Do not engage in much conversation with a woman” (Avot 1:5) except as regards idle, needless chatter; for that sort of conversation leads to sin, but not so debate over important, communal issues. Meeting in the same enclosed area for the sake of public service—which is tantamount to service of the Divine—does not habituate people to sin or cause levity; for all Jews, men and women alike, are holy, and not suspected of violating conventions of modesty or morality.

(Editor’s note: such an approach would certainly stem the mad tide of paranoia when it comes to constantly suspecting women of immodesty)

Finally, I have seen a newly contrived basis for not giving women the right to participate in elections (even to vote)—namely, out of consideration for the prohibition of flattery, lest a woman insincerely cast her vote for the individual or party that her husband favors. Sefer Malki Ba-Qodesh wrote correctly that such is not flattery but the upright nurturing of love. To which I would add: Would that this would be the case, that every woman would esteem her husband to the extent of suppressing her will on account of his. One might even voice this reason in favor of giving [women] the right to vote, so that a wife might thereby show love and esteem to her husband, and peace thereby abound in the house of Israel.

Conclusions:

1) A woman has an absolute right of participation in elections so that she be bound by the collective obligation to obey the elected officials who govern the nation.

2) A woman may also be elected to public office by the consent and ordinance of the community.

September 11, 2007

"Editor's notes" were included in the original article and are not the bloggers.

Yohanon Glenn
Yohanon.Glenn at gmail dot com

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